The Nazi regime lasted twelve years. That was a horribly long time, of course, but it is not long in a lifetime, at least for the survivors. Even middle-aged emigrants of the first hour, not to speak of the distinctive »Weimar generation« born around the beginning of the century, were faced with the problem of explaining themselves not only to each other and to publics in their places of refuge but also to postwar German audiences that included many of their old friends and enemies, and many more by whom they were known. A revealing and representative stock-taking took place in the early 1950s, when Franz L. Neumann contributed the opening chapter for a pioneering collection on German emigrants in several academic fields.¹

Neumann states the problem by reference to the wider theme of »the intellectual«, which had been closely related in Weimar to the dispute about Bildung and Wissenschaft, and which stood in a problematic relationship to German university culture.² He introduces the term at the very outset of his discussion of the »cultural emigration« in the »social sciences.« In terms reminiscent of the »softer« teachings of the Institut für Sozialforschung, he announces that »the intellectual is, or ought to be, the critical conscience of society« and a »metic« who must resist full social integration. He frames his discussion in a typology of relations between intellectuals and political systems. The liberal state was the Golden Age of the intellectual, Neumann contends, although even in that era the intellectual was occasionally compelled to flee into inner or outer emigration because the liberal state was ambivalent as between disengagement from the private realm and forward defense of its sovereignty. In the bureaucratized nation states of the next phase, the intellectuals were ever more susceptible to Julien
Benda’s »treason of the clerks«, Neumann contended, rather freely translating the concept to comprehend their reduction to the role of functionaries. The totalitarian state completes the process, he finds, so that not even inner emigration remains as an alternative to the total subjugation of the mind.

The intellectuals in exile, who had resisted bureaucratization, were nevertheless not exempt from the ever wider cultural sway of the nation state. They had been oriented to a public space constituted by contests about the German state, and their exile entailed the abrupt obsolescence of cultural skills. Tacitly putting aside emigrants (like himself) who attempted to act in their old as well as in their new settings, he says flatly that emigrant intellectuals had to separate themselves from their historical tradition and collective experience. They had to learn a new language, accumulate new experiences, begin a new life. Suffering the loss of possessions and status, like all disowned emigrants, they also had to assume the burden of new national culture in order to function at all. Their hatred of National Socialism and their relief over their escape from a lethal situation do not dispense with their difficulties, especially not for »political scholars« in an inclusive sense of that term, which Neumann leaves deliberately ambiguous between scholars who were politically active and scholars who studied politics. This subgroup among the emigrants had expressly confronted the brutal facts of politics. They had fought – or know that they should have fought – for a better political system. As individuals with family, as scientists, and as homini politici, they are triply bereft. Yet, Neumann concludes, the American universities remarkably provided this extraordinarily »tragic problem« with a »happy solution«.

At the present historical remove from Neumann’s statements, his sanguine – and politic – contention offers a strategic site for a more critical look at the mechanisms, costs, limits, and consequences of the exiles’ acculturation. His occasional paper
is itself a document of a far less smooth experience, which did not in fact see a »solution« that was quite so spontaneous or happy. One neglected aspect is starkly illuminated by Nina Rubinstein’s thesis about the extent to which political emigration tends to ossify past interpretative models among exiles and to constrict their intellectual resourcefulness, especially in the understanding of historical change.³ In Neumann’s case, this took the form of a persistent recourse to disputes about »labor in Weimar« as a key reference point in his thought.⁴ A second aspect, in mitigation of Rubinstein’s thesis and of special interest here, is the recognition of the extent to which acculturation comprised a difficult and unfinished negotiation, an activity for which Neumann had exceptional talent, not least by virtue of his experience as a protagonist in the Weimar labor regime.⁵

The aim of the present study is to correct the imbalance introduced by my earlier emphasis on perplexities that inhibited and haunted Neumann’s work in exile and to discuss some elements of the creative response that enabled Neumann to achieve the successes that are undeniable on the record and to produce important work in exile. While the »Rubinstein effect« dramatizes a dimension of exile, it is not a deterministic and all-embracing explanation. The wider task is to understand the diverse negotiating relations, which a number of the emigrants were nevertheless able to generate, and which enabled surprisingly many of them to achieve something like the »happy solution« of which Neumann spoke.

The Case of Franz L. Neumann

Franz Leopold Neumann was born to a lower-middle class Jewish family on May 23, 1900 in Kattowitz in Silesia. After his doctoral dissertation in law and his qualification for legal practice, he apprenticed with the leading Social Democratic labor lawyer, Hugo Sinzheimer, in Frankfurt, both as clerk and as teacher at the Labor Academy attached to the University.
the last years of the Weimar Republic, in practice with Ernst Fraenkel in Berlin, he was lead counsel for the major building trades union, as well as the Social Democratic Party. Since his name was reputedly high on the National Socialist arrest list, he left for London in May 1933. There, he pursued a course of studies at the London School of Economics with Harold Laski and Karl Mannheim, and he earned a second doctorate with a political theory dissertation on »The Governance of the Rule of Law« (1986). In 1936, he was brought to Max Horkheimer’s Institute of Social Research in New York, initially as legal advisor and eventually as member of the research program. Between 1943 and 1947, he was in U.S. Government service, mostly in policy research. In 1949, after two years as visitor, Neumann became Professor in the Department of Public Law and Government at Columbia University. His old Berlin friendships, his standing with the US military government, and his Columbia position enabled him also to play a part in the founding of the Free University in Berlin and in the restoration of the Hochschule für Politik. On September 2, 1954, Neumann died in an accident to an automobile in which he was a passenger.

Neumann’s publications may be divided into three periods. During his years as a labor lawyer in Weimar Germany, Neumann published several important articles – as well as a rather technical book – on the place of labor law in the scheme of the Weimar constitution, with labor law taken, following Hugo Sinzheimer, as a body of socially initiated law that runs against the property law foundations of the civil code. In the first years of exile after 1933, both in his posthumously published dissertation on the epoch of the »rule of law« (1986) and in his well-known »Behemoth« (1944) Neumann offered a diagnosis of National Socialism as a catastrophic malformation of the legal and political order of monopoly capitalism, drawing largely on Marxist analytical themes from the late Weimar years. His post-war writings, framed by a posited assumption of political
theory as the vehicle for expanding human freedom and by the presumption of a »totalitarian« threat immanent in advanced societies, express above all the resolve to work at his generation’s unfinished business with the implications of the Hitler regime. Neumann remained truer to his origins in the Social Democracy than he acknowledged, with his ethical demands upon that party serving, almost to the last, as the practical guide of his political thought. His political theory writings were thus constructive in aspiration, notwithstanding many evocations of the critical theory formulas of his admired friend, Herbert Marcuse; but they remained inconclusive. On balance, they represented an attempt to develop a theory of liberal democracy that would be responsive to the social and cultural concerns of the radical thinkers he admired, but that would, at the same time, support a secure constitutional order.\(^\text{10}\) This further development of his thought as a contribution to political theory, which he intended to provide direction both to the discipline of political science and the conduct of political practice remained an unfulfilled project.\(^\text{11}\)

A prime claim I want to make about Franz L. Neumann’s creative response to exile, then, is that he was a negotiator of exceptional resourcefulness and persistence, both as bargaining agent for the Institute of Social Research in the late 1930s and early 1940s and as bargainer on behalf of his distinctive vocational, intellectual, and political interests. He was first brought to the Institute precisely in this capacity, and his relations within the Institute, for both better and worse, were importantly shaped by this activity. Neumann’s subsequent arrival as political scientist, to the extent that he succeeded in the few years before his untimely death, was similarly dependent on his vocation for negotiation, a term that he himself often used to characterize his activities when others might have spoken of conversations, consultations or meetings.\(^\text{12}\) If the university offered a solution to the »tragic problems« of this »political
scholar«, whatever may have been true of others, it was because of his ability to make himself its partner in deals, involving especially the great foundations who importantly shape American intellectual life by their science policies.

Three things are especially important under the heading of Neumann as negotiator. First, Neumann’s negotiation practices involved costs as well as benefits, especially since he was dealing simultaneously within different bargaining structures, where the benefits in one could count as costs in the other. As is notoriously true of trade union officials, a bargaining agent may find that winnings at one bargaining table are counterbalanced by complications at others, especially in dealings with the agent’s own principal. Rank and file commonly despise the union bureaucrats on whom they nevertheless depend for their settlements. Similar ambivalences marked Neumann’s relations with his colleagues at the Institute for Social Research. Second, Neumann did not by any means succeed in all of the bargaining he undertook, with his attempt to gain recognition among political scientists as political theorist on his own terms as the most frustrating, although by no means total, failure. Third, and perhaps most important from the standpoint of the products of Neumann’s »creative response«, Neumann’s writings of exile have the negotiations of exile as an integral part of their documentary meanings.13

For present purposes, I will concentrate on two moments in the emergence of Franz L. Neumann as political scientist, a professional and disciplinary status unknown in Germany and correspondingly distrusted at Horkheimer’s Institute. First, I will look at the occasionally harsh exchanges between Neumann and his Institute colleagues in late 1941 and early 1942, dealing with the curiously entwined issues arising out of his work on »Behemoth« and his dealings with Columbia University sociologists about the selection of an Institute representative to offer a course in the department. Second, I will look
primarily at the interplay between Neumann’s attempt to
devide a comprehensive theoretical framework for his writings
of the early 1950s and his relations with the Rockefeller Foun-
dation, with a side glance at his simultaneous negotiations with
the Ford Foundation. In his negotiations with the Rockefeller
Foundation and, later, the Carnegie Corporation of New York,
Neumann was engaged in an effort to revise the parameters of
political science, at least at Columbia, to make it a congenial
setting for his own projects, while with the Ford Foundation, in
negotiations we cannot follow in the present paper, he hoped
mainly to establish and shape political science in Germany,
notably in Berlin, in the pursuit of political as well as intellec-
tual objectives. Played against the background of the resistances
and counter-designs of his counterparts in these negotiations,
the story of these enterprises illustrates the activist element in
acculturation, and its radical incompleteness.

Neumann and the Institute for Social Research

Neumann’s exceptional abilities as negotiator can be traced
during his association with the Institute of Social Research
between 1936 and 1948, first, as agent for the Institute in its
dealings with its host institution, Columbia University, with
potential funders, and with other academic actors and, second,
in maintaining and shaping his own relations to the Institute,
notably through his dealings with the Director, Max Hork-
heimer. His role in external negotiations, often on his own ini-
tiative, can be understood in large measure as instrumental to
his efforts to maintain himself within the Institute, not only in
the ordinary senses that he wanted to make a contribution to a
common effort or to fund his own work, although both played
a part, but also in the peculiar sense that he sought out deals that
strengthened his hand against a consensus among the Institute
insiders that he was dispensable from the standpoint of the
Institute’s »mission«, a conclusion that was manifested in his
being given a series of dismissal notices, beginning in September 1939.

There is a paradox in Neumann’s aims in relation to the Institute. On the one hand, it seems clear that he wanted it as a supportive setting for his work, a sheltered location, a kind of enclosed household at a remove from the alien host country – an asylum from the asylum, where an assemblage of thinkers worked intensively, under an inspirational leader with militant lieutenants, on the »theory« that could make sense of their exile and somehow surmount the defeat. On the other hand, he could not count on being retained without creating enough distance between himself and the others, to be sustained by negotiated terms he could influence rather than by the constitutive norms of the institution, which militated against him because of differences in training, temperament, and intellectual »fit« – and the external alliances and other deals he struck to strengthen his internal position were often enough seen as threats to the inner rationale of the group. Yet the striking thing is that he was able to generate a bargaining relationship with Horkheimer, to gain recognition as a party, which is the single most difficult step for the initiator of such a relationship, especially where a type of authority antithetical to negotiations is in place, as was true at the Institute.

It is not possible in a short presentation to display all the evidence behind these generalizations, but the case can be illustrated by comparing the correspondence between Horkheimer and Neumann with the correspondence about Neumann between Horkheimer and both Leo Lowenthal and Friedrich Pollock, notably in the fall and winter of 1941/42, when Neumann unexpectedly becomes the prime beneficiary of the Institute’s months-long efforts to gain greater recognition from the Columbia Sociology Department, and when Neumann also plays the decisive role in closing the deal with the American Jewish Committee for the Institute’s proposed anti-Semitism.
study. Common to both situations is Neumann’s special relationship with Robert A. Lynd, one of many contacts facilitated for Neumann by references from Harold Laski, with whom he earned his Ph.D. at the LSE. The youth and resourcefulness that enabled him to gain these bargaining weights before he arrived in the United States is of course an important part of the story. While Lowenthal and Pollock rage at Neumann, Horkheimer combines support for their aims in these controversies with a very different, diplomatic tone in his exchanges with Neumann, punctuated by letters devoted to theoretical matters, where he seeks Neumann’s opinion on matters in his special area of knowledge. A striking example of the bargaining mode is provided in a letter where Horkheimer is concerned to counter Neumann’s claim that the inclusion of a section on labor in the anti-Semitism proposal close to acceptance by the American Jewish Committee makes it necessary for the Institute to retain him (instead of exiling him to fulltime employment in Washington). I will quote at length. Horkheimer writes:

I realize very well that the section on labor, as it stands now, can only be carried through with your continue (sic) and substantial participation. But even if, as you suggest, you don’t accept the full-time job in Washington, I doubt strongly whether, while leading your tripartite existence, you will be able to work out yourself a great deal of the labor section. Since you will probably have to devote some time to other and even more essential sections – particularly those dealing with the political aspects of Anti-Semitism – I am of the opinion that the section on labor should be kept short. On the one hand, it ought to be limited to Anti-Semitic key groups among the workers, on the other hand, it ought to be supplemented by a study of the Anti-Semitism of other significant social groups, e.g., the farmers. The labor study in its present set-up seems to me to be almost too large in proportion to the concrete new findings on Anti-Semitism it can possibly yield. After all, labor is not the hotbed of Anti-Semitism … I remember very well that in our discussion with Rosenblum [of the American Jewish Committee], being a
skilful negotiator who wanted to present as large as possible a collection of ›samples‹, you concocted to my amazement that story that we were already busy with a project on labor Anti-Semitism. Your assumption that Rosenblum would go for your invention was certainly realistic, but we should not stick too much to such ad hoc imagery … Should [Rosenblum] actually change his mind because of this detail, we can hardly reckon with his genuinely being convinced of the basic idea of our project. Of course, I trust that you will do all in your power that your staying in Washington will not harm the project either with the Committee or with [Columbia sociologist and American scientific validator chosen by Neumann,] Robert A. Lynd.14

Three preliminary points of note. First, the question how much the Institute should interest itself in labor issues of any kind is a continuing source of disagreement between Neumann and the others, and I relate Neumann’s persistence to the »Weimar and labor« to the Rubinstein effect studied in my earlier paper.15 Second, it is clear that Horkheimer’s resistance is overdetermined. It is not only a question of lessening dependence on Neumann, whose earlier (political) contacts with Karl Frank, a prime leader of the left-wing »Neu Beginnen« group and research director of the Jewish Labor Committee must have been instrumental in generating the labor study, but also, I think, an eagerness to stay away from questions that highlight the Institute’s markedly ambiguous position on this hallmark theme of conventional Marxism. Third, Horkheimer’s resort to contemptuous peddler imagery where he speaks of Neumann’s »samples« and his »concocted« arguments is a sign of his hostility to the »skilful negotiator«, even while bargaining with him. At the end of the letter, he promises to see to it that Neumann’s move causes him no financial harm.

On the same day as his letter to Neumann, Horkheimer replies to a letter from Leo Lowenthal, one of his most loyal lieutenants, in which Lowenthal had denounced Neumann for having brought Robert Lynd into the project and urges Hork-
heimer »that we rather give up the project in the last minute than to get steered in a direction in which the Lynd-Neumann racket gets or believes to get a or the decisive say in our group and work.«¹⁶ Horkheimer agrees. He continues:

People in this country have never understood a set-up in which the scientific director has some saying in the administration. Scientific institutions here exercise a constant pressure on the lowest members which cannot be compared in the least with the freedom which has reigned in our Institute. The power is exercised by a board of businessmen and their scientific representatives in the organization, and this board itself is »sure« organized according to the most scrupulous democratic principles! People don’t want to understand that there can be a group of scholars working under a director not responsible to big business or to mass-culture publicity. Progressive thinkers like Lynd feel challenged to fight such an organization in the name of real democracy as a hierarchic, autocratic and most unusual phenomenon, particularly if the very few oldest members adhere to such obsolete doings as our metaphysical theories. This issue is most significant and I am, of course, deeply ashamed that Neumann cleverly uses it for his personal politics against the institution which has stood by him when he needed it most. He allies himself with Lynd under whose protectorship some other institutes really function in the usual way. I think that after Lynd has again been brought in by Neumann, we should change a situation which will use up all my energies.¹⁷

The contrast in tone is a mark of the difference between conversations with a bargaining opposite and with a team member, and it reveals Horkheimer’s incomprehending disgust with the bargaining culture. For us, the challenge is to recognize that intellectual work generated by this type of cooperation can nevertheless have integrity and worth, not least because the work of emigrants is almost invariably conditioned by both kinds of relations, with both introducing their own measure of distortion as well as insight.

As a measure of Neumann’s distanced connectedness to the
Institute, it should be noted that Neumann wrote »Behemoth«, his study of National Socialism, without subjecting the book to the internal processes of debate and reconciliation that shaped contributions to the Institute’s journal and the development of its projects. Neumann used the book as a lever in his intellectual dealings with the others, repeatedly invoking what he’d worked out in his book as authority for a position in a dispute. Like Erich Fromm, he had made a successful connection with the host culture, but unlike Fromm, who broke bitterly with Horkheimer, he could make this contact work for himself in relation to the group, in part because he could also make it work for them.

How an understanding of »Behemoth« in the context of Neumann’s simultaneous negotiations with Max Horkheimer and with the American constituency of his »friends«, notably at Columbia, can help with a reading of the book cannot be developed here at length. Important recent studies from several points of view agree that Neumann’s interpretation of National Socialism is poorly understood when it is taken as a statement of »the political theory of the Frankfurt School«, notwithstanding Horkheimer’s occasional celebration of the work.¹⁸

A critique of the book by Horkheimer never mailed to Neumann points in fact towards fundamental disagreements about the work of theory, especially in its relations to political practice. If both Horkheimer and Neumann tend to use the term »theory« as code for some kind of Marxism, it may be said that Horkheimer’s Marx is more like the depth theorist of »Capital« while Neumann’s Marx is the political analyst of »The Eighteenth Brumaire«. At issue is Neumann’s conception of political theory as a strategic intervention, and this in turn rests ultimately on a more positive conception of the autonomy and efficacy of action in the political sphere, a dimension that is markedly congruent with the standpoint of the negotiator.

In his draft critique, Horkheimer objects first to statements
that suggest that rise of National Socialism is in any way due to administrative or technical »mistakes« by Weimar governments: »Our conviction that fascism is the outcome of the basic social trends in Germany excludes the possibility« that such could matter. »This is important because we must under no circumstances give the Weimar heroes credit for having been willing to do things better, whereas they actually were tools of the disaster to come, both consciously and unconsciously.« »If there exists any real theoretical difference between us«, Horkheimer continues, in a passage that he struck from the draft itself,

it pertains to the optimism which you show not only with regard to the question of better administration but also to some of the deeper lying issues of society itself, such as an inherent and insoluble antagonism of state capitalism and also to some anthropological issues, such as the one mentioned in [the memorandum on psychological warfare that you just sent me], namely the impossibility of an enduring »split personality«, such as is promoted by the mechanism of National Socialism [and consequently the possibility of using this tension against the regime].

These comments recall an earlier difference between them. At a late stage in the composition of Behemoth, Neumann had solicited Horkheimer’s advice about a definition of bureaucracy that he had drafted for the book. Horkheimer answered at some length. His conclusion was that Neumann should reconsider his contention that bureaucrats are in a position to »authoritatively prescribe the behavior of man« inasmuch as this is »too subjective«: »What transpires in the heads or consulting rooms [of the bureaucracy], in the dark in either case, are objective processes, that have all the less to do with rational formation of will or spontaneity the more they elicit the appearance of reason and planning.«

Neumann however left his own definition unchanged. The
complementarity in his own thinking between volition and structural constraints creates a space to be filled by strategic readings of situations as arenas for action through the play of power and resistance. This governs his theoretical writings as well as his practice in negotiating for what he needs to make his work possible.

Neumann and American Political Science

The conjunction between the two constituents of strategic situations is no less clear in Neumann’s attempts ten years later to make his position as professor in Columbia’s Department of Public Law and Government and his uncertain status as a member of the political science profession better serve his aims as political theorist. The best-documented bargaining relationships in this pursuit are Neumann’s dealings with the Rockefeller Foundation, especially during the intertwined negotiations involving, on the one hand, Neumann’s search for funds to support a comprehensive work on »Political Systems and Political Theory« and, on the other, his participation in a conference and in consultations on ways for the Rockefeller Foundation to support political and legal theory.

It would be an error to think that nothing more was at issue here for Neumann than some research funding and opportunities. As in his dealings with the Institute, his hope was to develop resources to render his occupational setting more hospitable to his intellectual and political projects. The purposes were institutional not personal. He was engaged in activities for which there are no English terms as accurate as the German Wissenschaftspolitik, Kulturpolitik, Bildungspolitik. Here too, an immediate focus was the meaning of theory, an issue to which the Rockefeller Foundation unexpectedly declared itself to be open in 1952.

As was acknowledged by the Social Science Director of the Rockefeller Foundation, Joseph A. Willits, the foundation’s

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science policy since the 1920s had been an important factor in marginalizing philosophical or ethical inquiries in the social sciences. Unlike sociology, political science nevertheless still made room for research and teaching related to the older, pre-positivistic forms of theorizing about its subjects, but »political theory« was largely relegated to the study of canonical authors arrayed in one or another kind of Whig or pragmatic history, related to the primary work of political science mostly as a source of decorative »classical« comparisons and endorsements. In his important if controversial study of the emigrants’ impact on American conceptions of political theory, John G. Gunnell emphasizes important earlier shifts epitomized by George Sabine’s widely used textbook, which treated the principal theories as articulations of specific political configurations, not to be understood as making verifiable truth claims, and which equated insight into this relativistic reading with a liberal democratic aversion to absolutist claims. For Gunnell, the importance of the emigres for political theory in America is not only their bitterly earned rejection of this casual and optimistic skepticism, but also their introduction of epistemological complexities derived from what he calls the »Weimar Conversation«, and what he sees – and deprecates – as a consequent depoliticization of political theory debate and inquiry.

Neumann in any case does not fit this description. He had no interest in debating epistemology. Neumann’s aim in the consultations that eventually led to a short term Rockefeller program in Legal and Political Theory, as well as the core idea of the large-scale project that he asks the Rockefeller Foundation to fund is succinctly stated in a letter that shows clearly how his interventions in the one operation are related to negotiations on the second:

Yet our primary task to determine the truth of a political theory is to develop a true political theory for today [...]. My own view [...] is that the truth of political theory is determined by its
ability to maximize the freedom of man in a specific historical situation. I reject both [skeptical and dogmatic] extremes and I base the determination of the truth on the empirical analysis of a concrete historical stage as well as on philosophical thought. The reason is this: political theory is not and cannot be pure philosophy. It does not deal with eternal categories (like time, space, being, essence, accidents). It deals with politics and thus with power, which is an historical category. The great attraction – and the great difficulty – of political theory is precisely the need for this dual approach: theory and its empirical validation.²³

In his project proposal, then, this idea is specified in the question whether a democratic political theory developed by and for an agrarian society can suffice for a society which has undergone such profound social changes and which consequently requires more:

This question can, however, be answered only through a genuinely comparative study of political systems. The comparative study must also be theoretical and historical, that is, they must be seen in the process of social and political change. Only then can we hazard a forecast whether our institutions will be capable of peaceful adjustment to a fundamentally changed environment. […] There is, in short, no longer a theory of political institutions.²⁴

In his initial intervention at the Rockefeller Conference, Neumann puts a provocative offer on the table:

The question is, shouldn’t political theory be dangerous? Isn’t that the very function of political theory – to be dangerous? Don’t we face a situation that, in many cases, political theory and propaganda becomes indistinguishable? Isn’t it the function of political theory to be, so to speak, the critical conscience of political science? That is the primary role of political theory, as I see it. This, however, requires that political theory, apart from the study of its history, should not be taught in vacuo, but it should be taught in very close contact with the other segments of political science and other social sciences. To me it is not
understandable that a course in political institutions should be taught regardless of political theory; and that theory, political theory is, so to speak, a segment where you learn certain things which have no bearing whatsoever on public administration, on comparative government, on American government, and so on. There is already a setting in of a fragmentation in which political theory appears merely as a segment in addition to other segments. This is, in my view, due to the fact that the critical role of political theory in the analysis of political phenomena and political structures is not properly recognized, and that the injection of political theory considerations into the teaching or the writing of political institutions leaves very much to be desired. Therefore this twofold orientation: to be critical but to cooperate very closely with the other segments of political science is, in my view, one of the principal and main problems that ought to be discussed.25

This is a proposal for which Neumann never managed to gain recognition at a bargaining table. Both after the conference and in his evaluation of Neumann’s proposal to the foundation, Sabine – to take the American figure that Gunnell considers pivotal and whom Neumann also tries to win – sees Neumann’s proposed project as absurdly overambitious. He remarks: »I suppose that this is in part a national (Teutonic) characteristic: like Christian Wolff’s philosophy their political theory deals with ‘alle Dinge überhaupt’ in the most systematic fashion. To an American taste this seems pedantic and awakens prejudice.« Yet he admires some of Neumann’s substantive writings and concludes his assessment with a characteristic misunderstanding, that it would nevertheless be good if Neumann could provide a political theory of contemporary democracy as Locke did for his time, »meaning an accepted rationalization of democratic institutions and practice«.26 The aim Neumann put forward somewhat ambiguously in the course of his dealings with Rockefeller, however, was not to use positive knowledge about institutions to illuminate theories, but to use theories to illum-
nate institutions, even if the resulting understanding was deficient in strict scientific legitimacy. The test was whether the theory shows itself capable of comprehending the »empirical« data in a way that was helpful to the human political project of freedom.

In the context of Neumann’s simultaneous negotiations at the Rockefeller Foundation – his project and his interventions in the Rockefeller planning for a program in legal and political theory – his main theme was the rejection of the »dangerous [...] dichotomy« between political theory and empirical studies, concluding with the contention central already to his LSE dissertation (1986): »The verification of a political theory in political reality is still, in my view, the most vital concern of political theory.« Instead of a philosophical explication of the charged term, »verification«, however, as Gunnell would have expected, Neumann suggested historically legitimated models for the work he wanted to do and that he wanted political theory more generally to do for political science. His principal examples were Aristotle and Montesquieu.27 This claim was met with a shrug. There is a non-trivial parallel between Neumann’s reception and the terms on which Karl Mannheim was accepted by the people who admired him most in his London exile. While A. D. Lindsay and T. S. Eliot praised his stimulating »ideas« and »wisdom«, they were dismissive of his ambitious »theory«.28 When John Willits recommends that Neumann receive his grant, then, he expresses doubt about his ability to do what he promises but adds »he is a person of imagination, an effective teacher, and a man of ideas«.29

This judgment actually sums up Neumann’s success rather well, except that it disregards – if it does not contribute to – Neumann’s disappointment during the year remaining to him, his drastic curtailment of his project, or his uncertainty about whether and when he would return to Columbia. A sign of the unhappy conflicts among his negotiation projects is a memo-
Random in the files of the Ford Foundation, according to which the Executive Officer of his Columbia Department urged the Foundation to deny Neumann’s application for funding to go to Berlin for negotiations about the political science curriculum at the Free University (and to receive an honorary degree), on the grounds that Neumann could not afford to neglect the research project for which he had received funding from the Rockefeller Foundation. Neumann’s hopes of building a new institutional framework to implement the »happy solution« to his »tragic problem« remain ultimately unfulfilled. In any case, all negotiations were abruptly adjourned sine die by a fatality no one could control.

5 David Kettler, Social Regimes, Rule of Law and Democratic Social Change (Mobility and Norm Change vol. 3), Berlin and Cambridge, Mass. 2002.

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14 Max Horkheimer to Franz L. Neumann, November 8, 1942, Max Horkheimer Archives, Frankfurt, Germany, VI. 30, 315–6.
15 Kettler, Weimar, fn. 4.
16 Leo Lowenthal to Max Horkheimer, November 5, 1942, Max Horkheimer Archives, Frankfurt, Germany, VI. 15, 277–8.
17 Max Horkheimer to Leo Lowenthal, November 8, 1942, Max Horkheimer Archives, Frankfurt, Germany, VI. 15, 272–4.
18 Max Horkheimer to Franz L. Neumann. 18 May 1942, Max Horkheimer Archives, Frankfurt, Germany, VI. 30, 353.
20 Max Horkheimer to Franz L. Neumann, 13 August 1941, Max Horkheimer Archives, Frankfurt, Germany, VI. 30, 40–43.
28 Kettler and Meja, Mannheim, fn. 26, p. 286.
29 DSS Staff Meeting Minutes, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Sleepy Hollow, NY, 3. Series 200 Box 320 Folder 3805.